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I. INTRODUCTION
Even in the twenty-first century, violence and death followed
elections in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. Though
post-electoral conflict and violence has a number of possible causes
and plausible explanations, this article examines the island nation of
Mauritius and considers the role that the structure of its electoral
systems play in lessening post-electoral ethnic violence, and suggests
these systems as a possible model for other countries in the
developing world. Most urgently, this article considers what lessons
Mauritius may provide for Haiti, an island nation in the developing
world with very pressing needs after the January 2010 earthquake.
Mauritius is a small island nation in the Indian Ocean, and
today is one of the most developed nations in Africa - despite the
U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
prognostications about the country's future offered by the future
Nobel Laureate economist James Meade in the early 1960s.1
Mauritius' remarkable transformation can be partially attributed to
its unique electoral system, which by design requires compromise
between political actors from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.
Mauritius can be analyzed as a model for electoral systems and
constitutional designs in other developing nations.
Located 400 miles off the coast of Madagascar, 2 Mauritius
consists of the 720 square mile island of Mauritius 3 and the much
smaller island of Rodrigues. An extremely heterogeneous population
of 1.2 million people occupies the island.4 Since Britain granted
Mauritius independence in 1968, 5 there has been incredibly little
ethnic conflict on the island 6 despite the heterogeneity of the popula-
tion and the relatively small amount of space there is to share. This is
due, in part, to an electoral system that promotes multi-ethnic coali-
tions and compromises, and ultimately, democratic consolidation.7
In 1961, after chairing the Economic Survey Mission to
Mauritius, future Nobel Laureate economist James Meade wrote that
"Mauritius's development prospects [are] poor -that Mauritius [is] a
strong candidate for failure, with its heavy economic dependence on
one crop (sugar), vulnerability to terms of trade shocks, rapid
*Adam Aft is currently a law clerk for Judge Theresa L. Springmann, of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
**Daniel Sacks previously served as a Research Associate with the Mercatus Center
at George Mason University's Enterprise Africa project. Both authors would like to
thank Karol Boudreaux for her assistance with this article.
Arvind Subramanian, Mauritius: A Case Study, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2001, at 22, 22,
available at http://www.imf org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/subraman.htm.
2 Deborah Braiutigam, Institutions, Economic Reform, and Democratic Consolidation
in Mauritius, 30 COMP. POL. 45, 45 (1997).
3 Henry Srebnik, Can an Ethnically-Based Civil Society Succeed? The Case of
Mauritius, 18 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 7, 9 (2000).
4Id.
5 Shelia S. Bunwaree, Economics, Conflicts and Interculturality in a Small State:
The Case of Mauritius, 9 POLIS 1, 3 (2002) (Cameroon), available at
http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol1Ons/bunwaree.pdf.
6 See Eliphas G. Mukonoweshuro, Containing Political Instability in a Poly-ethnic
Society: The Case of Mauritius, 14 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 199, 222 (1991) (Zim.).
7 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 45; Bunwaree, supra note 5, at 3-4.
V. is
Mauritius and Constitutions in Development
population growth, and potential for ethnic tensions." 8 At the time of
its independence Mauritius primarily relied on sugar export for most
of its income; this remains true today.9
Over the next 40 years, Mauritius experienced tremendous
economic and social development. "By the mid 1990s [Mauritius's]
income distribution was on par with the highly equitable newly
industrializing East Asian countries."1 0 Today, a number of different
rankings highlight Mauritius's success, and by most measures it
ranks first in Africa. According to the World Bank's Doing Business
Index for 2010, as of June 2010 Mauritius was the best place in Africa
to do business, and the twentieth best in the world." The Ibrahim
Index of African Governance ranks Mauritius as the best-governed
nation in Africa.12 The Heritage Foundation considers Mauritius the
freest state in Africa, and the twelfth freest country in the world.13
The Economic Freedom of the World Index also ranks Mauritius the
freest nation in Africa.14 The Human Development Index places
Mauritius as the second most developed nation in Africa.15 The
8 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 22.
9 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 49.
'o Id. at 48.
1 Economy Rankings, DOING BUSINESS, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.doing
business.org/rankings (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
12 ROBERT I. ROTBERG & RACHEL M. GISSELQUIST, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT'L
AFFAIRS, STRENGTHING AFRICAN GOVERNANCE: IBRAHIM INDEX OF AFRICAN
GOVERNANCE 13 (2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/index.html
(search for "Strengthening African Governance;" then follow the "Strenghtening
African Governance: Results and Rankings 2008" hyperlink; then follow the
"Strenghtening African Governance: Index of African Governance 2008" hyperlink).
13 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.
heritage.org/lndex/Ranking.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
14 JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD, 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT 14 (2007), available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2007/EFW2007
BOOK2.pdf.
15 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING
CLIMATE CHANGE 230 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/
HDR 20072008 EN Complete.pdf.
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Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index ranks
Mauritius as the second best nation in Africa for its measures.16
Mauritius has reached such lofty rankings despite having
"few natural resources, no home grown technology, no defence
forces, little capital and import[ing] most of its food." 17 Mauritius's
success can be largely attributed to its institutions. 18 Mauritius is
home to "a remarkable and enviable era of highly inclusive demo-
cratic participation," 19 in large part because the institutions sur-
rounding the electoral system promote cooperation and consensus
building between ethnic groups.20 There is "a genuine consensus
among the major political parties on the rules of attaining, exercising,
and relinquishing power." 21 In turn, Mauritius's political stability
encourages economic development. 22 The ethnic tensions Meade
feared have been relatively non-existent.23
Mauritius's success story is impressive, which is why its
constitutional system provides a model for economic development.
In Part I, we review Mauritius's background and discuss aspects of
the island's history that played an important role in shaping the
country. Then, we explain the electoral system's development and
structure in Part II. In addition, we also engage in a brief textual
analysis of the individual rights and structural provisions in
16 ANNE CHANDIMA DEDIGAMA, PROP. RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS INDEX (IPRI) 2009 REPORT 20 (2009), available at http://www.
internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/atr Finall.pdf; see also 2008 Corruption
Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys indices/cpi/2008 (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
17 Bunwaree, supra note 5, at 3.
is Arvind Subramanian & Devesh Roy, Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle:
Meade, Romer, Sachs, or Rodrik?, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC
NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 205, 239 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Subramanian & Roy].
19 Id. at 207.
20 Stephanie Kodish, Balancing Representation: Special Representation Mechanisms
Addressing the Imbalance of Marginalized Voices in African Legislatures, 30
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2006).
21 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 208.
22 Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 222.
23 See generally Subramanian, supra note 1 (describing the economic growth of
Mauritius).
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Mauritius's Constitution. With the constitutional structure in mind
we argue, in Part III, some of the reasons why Mauritius provides a
valuable model for the developing world. There are difficulties in
strictly adhering to Mauritius as a model, which we discuss in Part
IV. Finally, we address in Part V what lessons Mauritius may provide
as Haiti continues its path to development in light of the recent tragic
events in that country.
II. MAURITius BACKGROUND
It is likely that Portuguese sailors, arriving at the turn of the
16th century, were the first humans to set foot on Mauritius.24 Until
then, only animal and plant life, such as the dodo, inhabited the
island. 25 The Portuguese named the island Crine, but did not settle
it.26 The Dutch renamed the island 'Prins Maurits van Nassaueiland'
after Prince Maurice of Nassau, 27 but did not settle the island until
1638.28 The Dutch made significant contributions to the island's flora
and fauna, including the introduction of sugar cane and European
animals.29 Unfortunately, the Dutch introduced rats among other
European animals, which played a role in the demise of the dodo.30
Dutch settlers stayed on the island until 1710, leaving after poor
administration, diseases, and natural disasters ravaged the
population.31
In 1715, the French claimed in the island and named it Isle de
France.32 They began settling the island in 1721 and made a
24 SYDNEY SELVON, introduction to HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MAURITIUS xi
(1991).
21 See Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 10.
26 SELVON, supra note 24, at xi.
27 id.
28 SELVON, supra note 24, at xi; see also VIJAYALAKSHMI TEELOCK, MAURITIAN
HISTORY: FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO MODERN TIMES 31 (2001).
29 SELVON, supra note 24, at xi, xvii; see also TEELOCIK, supra note 27, at 43.
30 SELVON, supra note 24, at xi; see also TEELOCK, supra note 27, at 44, 45.
31 SELVON, supra note 24, at xi; TEELOCK, supra note 27, at 45.
32 SELVON, supra note 24, at xvii; TEELOCK, supra note 27, at 48.
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significant impact.33 The French established a naval base, opened the
first sugar estates, and in 1744 opened the first sugar factory.34 The
French maintained a strong presence on the island -except for a brief
period during the French Revolution- until the British conquered the
island in 1810.35 In 1814, France formally ceded control to Britain.36
The imposition of British rule balanced between changing
institutions and maintaining stability. Notably, the British changed
the name of the island back to Mauritius 37 and made English the
official language.38 However, the British left the Napoleonic legal
system intact as well as other French institutions such as sugar
barons' property rights.39 In 1835, the British abolished slavery and
compensated plantation owners for the lost value of their slaves, who
had come from Madagascar.40 In order to replace their workforce,
plantation owners imported indentured Indian workers-both
Hindus and Muslims. 41 Descendants of these workers make up most
of the population in modern day Mauritius.
Mauritius's current population has a variety of ethnic back-
grounds and speaks at least fifteen languages.42 Almost seventy
percent of the population is Indo-Mauritian (the descendents of
workers brought from India),43 just over a quarter of the population is
Creole-Mauritian (the descendents of slaves brought to the island
from Africa),44 three percent is Sino-Mauritian (Chinese immigrants
33 SELVON, supra note 24, at xvii; TEELOCK, supra note 27, at 18.
34 TEELOCK, supra note 27, at 55-56, 73.
35 See id. at 60-64, 164.
36 S. A. de Smith, Mauritius: Constitutionalism in a Plural Society, 31 MOD. L. REv.
601, 601 (1968).
37 SELVON, supra note 24, at 203.
38 See CHIT G. DUKHIRA, MAURITIUS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT 17
(1992).
39 LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF MAURITIUS, BACKGROUND PAPER ON "REFORM OF
CODES" 2 (2010), available at http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/lrc/files/reform-
codes.pdf.40 1d. at 212.
41 Id. at 225-38.
42 Srebnik, supra note 3, at 9.
43 U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2011, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mp.html (last updated Feb. 1,2011).
44 id.
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and their descendents), 45 and two percent is Franco-Mauritian (the
descendents of French colonists).46
III. ELECTORAL SYSTEM
A. The System's Development
Mauritius has a long democratic history -particularly relative
to other African nations. The British introduced democracy to the
island with a very limited election in 1885, in which only propertied
French and Creole classes voted. 47 In 1926 Indo-Mauritians were
allowed to vote; in 1947 all literate adult males voted;48 in 1959
Mauritius instituted universal suffrage.49 However, bureaucrats
dominated much of the policy-making on the island. From 1885 to
1933, elected representatives made up only one-third of the
governing body. 50 Between 1933 and 1947, this number increased to
two-thirds, 51 and in 1947 "the unofficial majority in the Legislature
became an elected majority." 52 This change, as well as a widening of
the electorate, 53 led to the first Hindu majority government, 54 but also
demonstrated that a special system would be needed if all the
island's different ethnic groups were to be represented in the
legislature .55
45 id.
46 id.
47 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 52.4
1 Id. at 52-53.49 Id. at 53.
50 Smith, supra note 36, at 604.
51 id.
52 id.
53 id.
54 id.
55 See id. at 604-05. Mauritius is different than many other African countries in that
its electorate is comprised of only four major groups as opposed to a greater number
of groups in other African countries. With the Mauritian plurality consisting of less,
but more definable groups, the special electoral system ensures a wider participation
and support for any governing coalitions. See William F.S. Miles, The Mauritius
Enigma, 10.2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 91, 102 (1999).
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A period of institutional change followed, during which
suffrage became universal and the movement toward independence
began.56 From the late 1940s through the 1960s, Mauritius underwent
a number of changes to its electoral system.57 Constituencies were
redrawn,58 the use of party lists debated, 59 and "under-represented
minorities were allocated nominated seats." 60 These changes and
trials led to the system the British implemented in the late 1960s at
the time of the independence referendum.
Before Britain granted Mauritius independence, British
electoral commissioners convened a final and decisive constitutional
conference in London in 196561 to design the country's current
electoral system. 62 This conference intended "to ensure safe and
adequate representation for all sectors of the Mauritian popula-
tion."63 The British Government feared ethnic tensions and their
potential for destabilizing the Mauritian economy. 64 This concern did
not belong to the British alone -only fifty-five percent of Mauritians
voted for pro-independence parties in the country's first election 65
because of fears that the Hindu majority "would use its majority
power against the numerically weaker groups." 66 Forty-four percent
of Mauritians voted against independence in a referendum immedi-
ately prior to independence. 67 Fears over ethnic violence were made
worse by riots and fighting between Creoles and Muslims after
56 Id.
51 See id at 604-11.
51 Id. at 606.
59 Id. at 605-06.
60 Id. at 606.
61 Id. at 67.
62 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 207.
63 Raj Mathur, Parliamentary Representation of Minority Communities: The
Mauritian Experience, 44 AFR. TODAY 61,61 (1997).
64 Smith, supra note 36, at 606. It is likely that the British Government's main
concern was preventing violence in Mauritius during any transition to Mauritian
independence.
65 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 207.66 id.
61 Id. at 241.
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parliamentary elections in August of 1967.68 However, that was a rare
instance of ethnic violence in the island's modern history. 69
Though Mauritius's population was, and is, comprised of a
myriad of ethnic groups, the country's Hindu population has long
constituted a majority. 70 Without a carefully designed electoral
system, any party appealing to the Hindus would have "an auto-
matic hegemonic control over the Mauritian political process." 71
Moreover, the designers sought a system that would not only prevent
one ethnic group's dominance, but also minimize or reduce the
country's ethnic divisions. 72 The final design of the system "[forces]
the main parties to seek support from all communities." 73
The results of changes to the electoral system over the
preceding two decades informed the London conference in 1965.
Though the conference resolved to grant Mauritius independence if a
newly elected government gained support for independence, it did
not finalize the electoral system.74 Instead, the British Secretary of
State appointed a commission "to make recommendations on an
electoral system, constituency boundaries and the best method of
allocating seats in the Legislature." 75 The Banwell Commission
presented its report in 1966, and Mauritius accepted its design of
constituencies and representation in 1967, using them to this day.76
Perhaps the most notable decisions made by the commission
were those options that it chose to avoid. The commission chose not
to implement single member constituencies, 77 or direct proportional
68 Id. at 207.
69 Smith, supra note 36, at 602.
70 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 207.
71 Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 201.
72 See Braiutigam, supra note 2, at 53.
7, WORLD BANK & NETLIBRARY, INC., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE
STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 113 (1997), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
DPIFX1PSC0.
74 See Smith, supra note 36, at 608.
75 id.
76 Id. at 609.
77 Br~iutigam, supra note 2, at 53.
2010
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representation, 78 as either would have led to an overrepresentation of
the Hindu population in the parliament,79 and possibly ethnic and
linguistic polarization.8 0 Nor did the commission implement a fully
consociational system,8 ' as lobbied for the island's Muslim com-
munity, because such a system (where a certain number of seats
would be held for each ethnic community, delegated by a system of
separate voter rolls) would preserve the island's ethnic divisions at
the expense of national unity.8 2 Rather, the commission's final system
acknowledged ethnic concerns, using consociational principles in a
parliamentary system.8 3
Mauritius also implemented the Banwell Commission's
suggestions for constituency design.8 4 As recommended by the
commission, on the island of Mauritius the twenty constituencies are
divided evenly between rural and urban areas.8 5 The borders of these
constituencies were drawn prior to independence, with the intent of
ensuring the representation of both Hindus and the general
population.86 Rural areas were home to a majority Hindu population,
and urban areas were home to the other sections of the population.8 7
The Mauritian Government rejected the Banwell Commis-
sion's attempts to "safeguard under-represented minorities." 88 The
commission had made two recommendations. The first was that if a
party received more than twenty-five percent of the vote, but less
than twenty-five percent of the seats, it would receive additional
seats in order to bring its representation in the legislature to twenty-
five percent.8 9 Second, five extra seats would be allocated to "best
losers," from underrepresented parties and communities, based on a
78 Mathur, supra note 63, at 61.
79 Brutigam, supra note 2, at 53.
80 Mathur, supra note 63, at 61-62.
81 Brautigam, supra note 2, at 53.
82 id.
83 id.
84 Smith, supra note 36, at 609.
85 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
86 Mathur, supra note 63, at 62.
87 id.
8' Smith, supra note 36, at 609.
89 Id.
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formula that only granted these extra seats to parties that "obtained
at least 10 percent of the total vote and at least one directly elected
member and unless it had a defeated candidate belonging to the
community entitled to the seat to be allocated." 90
The Mauritian Government rejected these suggestions 91 due
to fear that this system would not properly represent the island's
Muslim population,92 and would disrupt the existing support of
many of the other existing parties. 93 In order to resolve the situation,
the British dispatched the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the
Colonies to Mauritius. A compromise was reached, with Mauritius
accepting the system for appointing "best losers," which is still used
today.94
B. The System's Structure
The Mauritian Constitution ("Constitution") provides the
supreme law of the land.95 This section explores the Constitution's
structure from an individual rights and then a structural perspective.
Focus is placed on the structural lessons that can be learned from the
Constitution. However, an important body of literature exists addres-
sing constitutional provision of rights, which is why this article
addresses individual rights before discussing the Constitution's
structure.
1. Individual Rights
The individual rights protected in the Constitution are mainly
negative rights, as opposed to positive rights. 96 It is important to
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 id.
93 Id. at 610.
94 id.
95 The CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. 1, para. 2 (Mauritius).
96 See Daniel Kaufmann, Human Rights and Governance, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT 352, 352 (Philip Aston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005) (discussing the
difference between first generation negative rights-political and civil rights
protections and second generation positive rights social and economic rights).
2010
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consider the types of protections for individual rights before
considering the Constitution's structure because of the recent focus
on constitutions as means to protect positive individual rights. 97 For
example, the South African Constitution provides that "[elveryone
has the right to have access to-(a) health care services, including
reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social
security . *..."98 Given the supremacy of the Mauritian Constitution,
provision of positive rights would necessarily create a hierarchy
favoring these positive rights.99
In an evolving Lockean and Jeffersonian manner, the
Constitution declares as fundamental freedoms, "the right of the
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and protection of the
law." 100 The Constitution also provides rights similar to those
established by U.S. Constitution's First Amendment, 101 and rights
protecting property, including governmental taking without com-
pensation.102 These fundamental rights are not only negative rights,
but also cornerstone negative rights that free societies have sought
throughout history. 03 The importance of the first rights established
as the Lockean basis for a free society-life, liberty, and property-
cannot be overstated.104 These rights are emphasized and catalogued
in the Constitution because they are the essential building blocks for
strong institutions necessary to foster development. Development is
difficult, if not impossible, without these basic guarantees. 105
9' See id at 23.
98 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AER. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1).
99 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. 1, para. 2 (Mauritius).
I Id. at ch. 1I, para. 3(a).
101 Id. at ch. 11, para. 3(b).
I2 Id. at ch. 1I, para. 3(c).
103 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
104 See Kaufmann, supra note 96, at 382 ("Voice and participation mechanisms are
thus not only very important because of their fundamental value, but also due to their
instrumental value as key to socio-economic development outcomes. And in addition
to the evidence in this respect from cross-national data, this finding also applies at
the ('micro') project level: investment projects funded by the World Bank in settings
with better civil liberties and participatory mechanisms are found to have a much
higher socio-economic impact.").
1o5 Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13
THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (1998).
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The Constitution provides broad protections of life and
liberty, enumerating the only instances where depravations of them
are allowed. 106 This creates a presumption of liberty in all situations
in which one of the specific enumerations is not implicated.107 These
liberty rights expressly protect from slavery and torture. 108
The Constitution goes on to enumerate a strong set of specific
protections for property. 10 9 It provides protections for criminal
defendants, such as a presumption of innocence until proven guil-
ty. 110 It contains specifically enumerated protections related to First
Amendment type rights."' These rights include: freedom of assem-
bly, conscience, expression, movement, and freedom to establish
schools. 112 The Constitution also guarantees protection from
discrimination. 113
Underlying all of these rights is an enumeration of methods
for enforcement.114 Essentially a jurisdictional provision, it confers
broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in order to remedy the
violation of a constitutional right.115
The reason for focusing on the negative rights provided in the
Constitution is twofold. First, the development and implementation
of positive rights is dependent on a sufficient base of negative
rights. 116 Second, the only individual rights in the Constitution are
the negative rights discussed above. These negative rights are
especially important in light of the recent downward trend of
106 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. 11, para. 5(1) (Mauritius).
107 See generally RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2006) (applying similar reasoning in the context of the
U.S. Constitution).
108 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. 11, para. 6, 7 (Mauritius).
'09 Id. at ch. 1I, para. 8.
hold. atch. 11, para. 10.
111 Id. at ch. 1I, para. 11.
112 id
113 Id. at ch. 1I, para. 16.
114/I. at ch. 11, para. 17.
115 id.
116 Kaufmann, supra note 96, at 381.
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negative rights in many developing countries. 117 Positive rights are
less likely to develop when negative rights decline. 18 Further, low
levels of political and civil rights are inversely related to high
incidences of state capture. 119 State capture is an especially important
problem for many reasons. An example being, as enforcement for
negative rights wanes state capture increases and makes it more
difficult to better ensure negative rights.120 Structural guarantees can
help prevent this downward spiral,121 which is why a strong
constitutional guarantee of negative rights is important for prevent-
ing state capture and stimulating positive development outcomes.
The Constitution's provisions of individual rights also
provide an important lesson for development professionals and
NGOs. While many development professionals seek to meet goals
and benchmarks based on positive rights, it is important not to lose
focus on maintaining a negative rights base. 122 Kaufmann observes,
"[I]gnoring the status of [negative rights] in a country may have
significant implications for aid effectiveness, both indirectly through
the 'mediating' role of control of corruption, and directly through the
positive impact that progress of [negative rights] can have on [posi-
tive rights]." 123 Having established the importance of the underlying
negative rights protected by the Constitution, this article now
addresses the structure of the Constitution.
2. Structural Constitution
The structural Constitution forms the basic institutions that
contribute to the Mauritian success story. This article reviews the
Constitution and its structural design in some detail in order to later
117 Id. at 6 fig. 1.
118 See id
119 See id
120 See id
121 See id
122 See generally U.S. Dept. of State Geographic Bureaus, A Guide to American
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations Active in Sub-Saharan Africa
(May 1995), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/afr/950501NGO
Africa.html.
121 See Daniel Kaufmann, Human Rights and Governance, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT 352, 352 (Philip Aston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
V. is
Mauritius and Constitutions in Development
discern what value these institutions have in fostering development
in Mauritius. The textual analysis in this section serves as a reference
point for the basis of at least one set of successful institutions in a
developing country. The Constitution provides for the President,124
Parliament, 125 and the Judicature. 126 Given that the Mauritian
government is parliamentary, this article first reviews the parliament
and then briefly discuss the other branches of government.
The Mauritian parliament, created at independence in March
1968,127 has seventy seats, 128 and replaced a 34-member Legislative
Council (which had 21 elected seats) that had been ruling the country
since 1947.129 Sixty of the seats are filled through the election of three
candidates in each of the twenty constituencies. 130 Representatives
from Rodrigues fill two additional seats. 131 The three candidates in
each Mauritian constituency and the two candidates in Rodrigues
who receive the most votes are elected.1 32 Per Schedule 1 of the
Mauritian Constitution,133 the Electoral Supervisory Commission fills
the remaining eight seats based on criteria intended to balance ethnic
and party concerns.1 34
In running for parliament, every candidate must declare their
membership in an ethnic group- out of the four officially recognized
groups (Hindu, Muslim, Sino-Mauritian, or General Population 135) -
on their nomination form. 136 After an election of sixty-two members
of parliament, the electoral commission examines the results and
determines how each of the four ethnic communities is repre-
124 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. IV (Mauritius).
121 Id. at ch. V.
126 Id. at ch. VII.
127 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 223.
128 Mathur, supra note 63, at 62.
129Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 5.30 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
131 Mathur, supra note 63, at 62.
132 Id. at 62-63.
133 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, sched. I (Mauritius).
134 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11; Mathur, supra note 63, at 63.
135 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
136 Id.; Mathur, supra note 63, at 63.
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sented.137 From these calculations, the Electoral Supervisory Commis-
sion selects the "best losers" to fill the remaining eight seats.138
The "best losers" are candidates from recognized parties who
stood for election in their constituencies and received the highest
percentage of votes cast without winning.139 The "best loser" seats are
awarded in two ways.140 The four seats are only based on community
representation.1 41 The second four seats are based on community and
party representation. 142 To calculate which parties are underrepre-
sented, the electoral commission compares the number of repre-
sentatives from each group to the population demographics from the
1972143 census, the last census that required the population to declare
their ethnicity.144 The formula to determine the best losers divides the
total of each population by one plus the number of representatives
from that population.145 The winner is the best loser from the popu-
lation with the largest quotient-regardless of his or her party.146 This
mathematical process is repeated for three more of the "best loser"
seats.14
7
The electoral commission selects four additional "best losers"
by both community and party representation. 48 Though the
calculations used are the same as in the first set of four seats,149 in
selecting the second set of four seats the electoral commission pays
attention to preserving the political balance established by the
election.150 If the selection of the second four "best loser" seats
strengthens the opposition coalition's position in parliament, the
137 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
L38 Id.
139 Id.; Mathur, supra note 63, at 64.
140 Mathur, supra note 63, at 63.
141 id.
142 id.
143 id.
144 id.
145 id.
146 id.
147 Id. at 63-64.
148 Id. at 63.
149 id.
150 Id. at 67.
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electoral commission must give the winning coalition an equal
number of seats to rebalance the parliament toward the results of the
election.' 51 The "best loser" seats are not intended to unbalance the
results of an election, but rather are aimed toward "[correcting] any
imbalance in the representation of various communities that results
from the direct election."'152
The parliament's structure is central to the Mauritian govern-
ment; the other government institutions are determined by the
parliament. The parliament chooses the President, who serves for a
five-year term. 53 All of the executive power is vested in the
President. 54 Along with the President, there is also a Vice President
who the parliament appoints for a five-year term.155 Both the
President and Vice President are eligible for reelection. 56 Other than
directing how to appoint the President and Vice President and
delineating their terms, Chapter IV of the Constitution does not
provide much other instruction.157
The Constitution establishes a Supreme Court with unlimited
jurisdiction to hear all cases, as well as two courts of appeal, divisions
of the Supreme Court, to hear intermediate civil and criminal cases.158
After establishing the Court, the Constitution grants jurisdiction and
lays out the process and types of decisions that litigants may
appeal 59 One of the more notable decisions that litigants may appeal
to the Supreme Court is any decision relating to highly valued
property. 160 This provision gives effect to the negative rights relating
to property that were discussed above.161
151 Id. at 72.
112 Id. at 67.
153 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. IV, para. 28 (Mauritius).
154 Id. at ch. VI, para. 58.
155 Id. at ch. IV, para. 29.
156 Id. at ch. IV, para. 28, 29.
157 Id. at ch. IV.
158 Id. at ch. VII, § 76.
159 Id. at ch. Vii, § 81.
160 Id. at ch. VII, § 81(1)(b).
161 See supra Part II.B.1.
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The Constitution's other structural provisions focus on
important pre-commitments, especially for developing states. 162 The
Constitution provides an Ombudsman, who the President appoints
only after consultation with multiple parties, including the minority
leadership in Parliament. 163 The Ombudsman is charged with
expansive abilities to initiate investigations on request or by using his
judgment.164
The last major chapter of the Constitution addresses finances
and places restrictions on how the government may spend money.165
The main restriction in this chapter is the necessity that expenditures
are provided for by law.166
These structural provisions and resulting protections for
individual liberty are not necessarily the model for a successful
constitution in developing countries. The importance of the Consti-
tution, both in terms of individual negative liberties and its structure,
is its creation of a system of government that fosters, not impedes,
growth in Mauritius.
IV. MAURITIUS AS A MODEL
We now consider to what extent Mauritius can serve as a
model for development, appraising positive outcomes in Mauritius,
as well as other factors that may be contributing to the country's
relatively successful development path.
A. Positive Outcomes
Mauritius' complex electoral system produced stability and
minimized conflicts since implementation. The system is designed to
prevent one ethnic group from dominating politics, and therefore
162 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Ejan
Mackaay, The Emergence of Constitutional Rights, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 15 (1997).
163 THE CONST. Mar. 12, 1968, ch. IX, para. 96 (Mauritius).
164 Id. at ch. IX, para. 97.
165 Id. at ch. X.
166 Id. at ch. X, para. 104.
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encourages coalition building across ethnic groups and incentivizes
cooperation over ethnic out-bidding and rivalry.167
Mauritius consolidated its democracy in large part because
the rules of its electoral system make forming a consensus necessary,
encourages compromise, and discourages extreme positions. 168 Maur-
itian political parties and ethnic groups have become well practiced
at building consensus through the regular formation of coalitions.169
The Constitution's structure encourages negotiation and compromise
amongst the country's political parties and ethnic groups by incen-
tivizing coalition formation-in order to govern, parties needed to
find partners to share power with.170 Over time, groups learned how
to share benefits and build support amongst coalition partners,
preventing defections. 171 The result of this process has been a
"pattern of side payments to coalition partners first used in the post-
independence stabilization [to become] institutionalized." 172
Since the first post-independence election, political parties
formed coalitions in order to govern Mauritius.173 In 1968, a coalition
comprised of two Hindu-affiliated parties and a Muslim party
emerged to form the first independent government 74 in an election
"dominated neither by purely ethnic concerns nor overt political-
party ideological differences." 175 Non-ethnic parties emerged
quickly-founded in 1969, the Mouvement Militant Mauricien
("MMM") emerged as a "nonsectarian, class-based alternative to the
communal politics." 176 A large number of political parties have
continually existed in Mauritius 177 and form into coalitions during
elections, "agreeing not to run against each other [in order] to
167 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
168 Brdutigam, supra note 2, at 53.
169 id.
170 id.
171 Id. at 56.
172 Id. at 57.
173 WORLD BANK, supra note 73.
174 Brdutigam, supra note 2, at 49.
175 Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 201.
176 Brdutigam, supra note 2, at 49.
177 See Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11-12.
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prevent a split in the vote."'178 It is likely that the emphasis on non-
ethnic issues in elections is one reason for a lack of post-electoral
violence in Mauritius.
The compromises encouraged by Mauritius' electoral insti-
tutions may have also prevented another source of conflict, often tied
to ethnicity, common in other developing nations. By institu-
tionalizing side payments and the sharing of benefits between
parties 179 the Mauritian electoral system prevents "tribalism of the
elite," a major cause of conflict in the developing world,180 where
holding power in government becomes a means to access resources,
jobs, and wealth. 181 Across Africa, conflict surrounds elections
because ruling parties do not want to surrender the wealth they
posses via access to government coffers.182 The Mauritian system
ensures that wealth is spread among ethnic groups through their
ruling coalitions by forcing power sharing. 83
The promotion of compromise and consensus formation may
decrease violence in another way. The Mauritian system "encourages
moderation and provides disincentives for . . . 'outbidder' parties,
those who appeal exclusively to ethnic extremes." 184 This is
important because polarizing the electoral landscape along ethnic
1
7 8 Id. at 11.
179 id.
180 Pranab Bardhan, Method in the Madness? A Political-Economy Analysis of the
Ethnic Conflicts in Less Developed Countries, 25 WORLD DEV. 1381, 1383 (1997).
181 Id.
112 See, e.g., Andreas Schedler, The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,
23 INT'L POL. Sci. R. 103 (2002); Robert H. Bates, Ethnicity, Capital Formation,
and Conflict (Center of International Development at Harvard University, Working
Paper No. 27, 1999), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezpsite/
storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/cid/publications/faculty /wp/
027.pdf.
'8' See infra Part V.B.
184 Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 11.
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lines -"ethnic outbidding" -can lead not only to mistrust,185 but also
to ethnic violence.186
B. Other Factors
The structure of Mauritius's electoral institutions plays a
significant role in lessening ethnic tensions and creating democratic
stability, allowing the nation to develop. Other factors also contri-
buted to the nation's success in consolidating democracy and devel-
oping economically.
Mauritius's long democratic history likely supports the
carefully designed electoral system. As discussed above, elections
had been taking place in Mauritius since 1885,187 though that election
was only open to a small portion of the population.188 From 1926
onwards, however, significant portions of the island's population
were allowed to vote.189 By 1968, "much of the male electorate had
had almost a generation of experience in the forms of democracy." 190
Familiarity and practice with a democratic system may well have
helped ease Mauritius' democratic consolidation. However, at the
time of independence, democracy was clearly not consolidated, as the
riots of 1967 demonstrated distrust with the electoral system. The
consociational "Best Loser" system surely played a role in over-
coming these fears.
Mauritius's economic growth from the late 1960s to the
present day has quite clearly contributed to an increased standard of
living on the island and improvements in the well being of its
citizens. 191 Economic growth may have also played a role in reducing
185 James D. Fearon, Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence 6 (Aug. 11, 2004)
(unpublished article), available at http://www.stanford.edu/-jfearon/papers/
ethreview.pdf (2004).
186 Ashish Chaturvedi, Rigging Elections with Violence, 125 PUB. CHOICE 189, 189-
90 (2005).
117 Briutigam, supra note 2, at 52.188 Id.
189 Id. at 52-53.
190 Id. at 53.
191 See, e.g., N. L. Aumeerally, 'Tiger in Paradise': Reading Global Mauritius in
Shfiting Time and Space, 17 J. OF AFR. CUL. STUD. 161, 161 (2005) (discussing
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conflict over time. A major cause of civil conflict is low per capita
income. 192 As Mauritius's per capita income improved over time,
Mauritius experienced less civil conflict.193 However, it is hard to
map which way this relationship moves. The consensus-building
nature of the electoral institutions in Mauritius fostered economic
development and reduced the potential for civil conflict. 194 Further-
more, democratic stability within the government allows manage-
ment of economic reforms' 95 and encourages foreign investment. 96
Perhaps the most important factor in Mauritius's success in
reducing economic tension, consolidating stable democracy, and
developing economically, is that it followed its rules where so many
other nations did not.197 Following the rules is especially difficult
given the problems that rent-seeking and capture occur at all levels of
government in developing countries. 198 As discussed above, the
problem of state capture is accompanied by a significant cascading
problem. 99 Once enforcement and the rule of law dissipate enough,
most economic activity is forced to operate outside of a formal legal
framework.200 While discussing a different development context, de
Soto observes that
[p]erhaps the most significant cost was caused by the
absence of institutions that create incentives for people
to seize economic and social opportunities to specialize
within the marketplace .... [Pleople who [can] not oper-
ate within the law also [can] not hold property effi-
Mauritius' self promotion as a "Tiger in Paradise" similar to the successful Asian
tigers).
192 PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION 3-17 (2007). Christopher Blattman &
Edward Miguel, Civil War 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14801, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14801.pdf?new
window-1.
193 See generally Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 36.194 Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 222.
195 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 53.
196 Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 222.
197 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 46.
198 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, 17-28, 81-89 (3rd ed. 2000).
'99 See supra Part III.B.2.
200 DE SOTO, supra note 198, at 81-89.
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ciently or enforce contracts in the courts; nor [can] they
reduce uncertainty through limited liability systems and
insurance policies or create stock companies to attract
additional capital and share risk. Being unable to raise
money for investment, they [can] not achieve economies
of scale or protect their innovations through royalties
and patents.201
In light of our earlier analysis of the Constitution, the potential for
operation outside of the rule of law is even more important. The
Constitution provides protection of property and other rights, but
without proper enforcement and the ability of citizens to vindicate
their rights, the basis for any development fails. Sustained investment
leading to consistent productivity gains is very difficult in an
environment without the rule of law.20 2
The consistent protection and evolution of property rights in
an endogenous manner is a direct result of the Mauritian system's
inclusive nature.20 3 This progression fits within Mancur Olson's story
in Dictator Democracy and Development.20 4 In this narrative, Olson
notes that the initial point of nature revolves around small groups
forming.20 5 These groups then seek to extract rents as roving
bandits.20 6 Over time, these groups recognize that they can extract
greater rents as a stable bandit.207 This leads Olson to observe that
if a roving bandit rationally settles down and takes his
theft in the form of regular taxation and at the same time
201 Id. at 83.
202 KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 91-153 (2006).
203 Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth 21-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7540, 2000), available at http://www.hks.
harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research 0/o20papers/ institutions.PDF.
204 Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AMER. POL. SCI.
R. 567 (1993).
205 Id. at 567.
206 Id. at 568.
207 id
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maintains a monopoly on theft in his domain, then those
from whom he exacts taxes will have an incentive to
produce. The rational stationary bandit will take only a
part of income in taxes, because he will be able to exact a
larger total amount of income from his subjects if he
leaves them with an incentive to generate income that he
can tax.2
08
This observation applies in the Mauritian context to the extent that its
parliamentary structure provides continued enforcement and recog-
nition of constitutional protections. For development purposes, the
growth of endogenously originating outcomes is more important
than the exact scope of an institution. The Mauritian experience
teaches that the more successfully a constitutional structure fosters
the rule of law and incubates endogenous growth of respect for
negative rights, the more successful that constitutional structure will
be in fostering development.
V. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION
A. Caveats
Though the Mauritian electoral system has been highly
effective in preventing ethnic conflict and promoting interethnic
cooperation, 209 it faces meaningful criticism. The most important
criticism is that the current system enhances or promotes ethnic
divisions over the creation of a central Mauritian identity.210 Some
suggest that the current system is outdated.211 Many also suggest that
the formalization of ethnic groups within the Constitution and the
electoral system prevents Mauritius from developing a true civil
society or a national identity.212 The continual reference and use of
the same four ethnic groups ingrains those groups in society, even
208 id.
209 See .supra Part IV.A.
210 Mathur, supra note 63, at 74.
211 Id. at 74-75.
212 Bunwaree, supra note 5, at 4; Srebrnik, supra note 3, at 8; see also Mathur, supra
note 63, at 74.
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though they may not be relevant any more. Continued use of the
1972 census to represent the country's ethnic breakdown may illu-
strate a lack of progress.213 Moreover, according to Mauritian Political
Scientist Raj Mathur, "Since 1976... communalism has ceased to play
an important role in the way people vote."214 By continuing to use
ethnic identities enshrined in the constitution over forty years ago, it
is possible that the Mauritian electoral system is preserving outdated
visions of its own society.
However, changing the existing system could lead to further
issues. Removing or decreasing a minority group's rights, "may be
perceived by the ethnic minorities as attempts to deny them of their
rights." 215 A debate over what rights different ethnic groups deserve,
,may arouse communal sentiments that are detrimental to nation
building." 216
B. Considering the Institution
The Mauritian example is important because it allows
observations about the role effective institutions may play in devel-
oping countries, regardless of their exact contours. Douglass North
observes, "the answer [for development] lies in the characteristics of
the basic institutional environment and the degree to which these
basic ground rules are enforced." 217 North's insight regarding the
impact of institutions on development is crucial for analyzing the
degree to which Mauritius can function as a model for developing
countries elsewhere. However, the key questions are to what extent
institutional analysis can really provide concrete development
answers, and what about Mauritius can inform development
elsewhere in developing countries?
The Mauritian example can provide a number of benefits for
development challenges in developing countries, particularly in
213 Mathur, suipra note 63, at 63.
214 Id. at 75.
215 id.
216 id
217 Douglas C. North, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, 31 J. ECON. HIST.
118, 124 (1971).
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consideration of what type of institutions are necessary to move
economic activity toward production and away from redistribution.
The Mauritian Constitution successfully controls factions and fosters
productive activity in society. One of the keys to this success has been
a familiar notion since at least the Enlightenment and applied in
America's constitutional founding.2 1 8 Madison's famous Federalist 10
stresses the importance of making it very costly to use government in
order to redistribute wealth.219 Madison noted that:
[T]he most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who
are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a
like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of the government.220
This insight is essential in the developing world where limiting
harmful wealth redistribution while encouraging wealth creation is a
pervasive issue. Through its unique voting structure, most of the
country is invested in the success and outcomes overseen by the
Mauritian Constitution. This alone is impressive and a laudable goal.
However, the real importance is that by effectively investing the
population in the Constitution and its enforcement, the structural
benefits of the Constitution also shine through. An effectively
adopted and enforced constitution allows for pre-commitment and
218 Id. at 124-25.
219 id
220 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Yale Univ. Press, 2009).
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the reduction of agency costs. 221 In the developing world, one of the
largest agency costs is wealth redistribution and a government more
invested in taking than creating.222
Mauritius also shows the importance of incremental growth.
The Mauritian Constitution provides a pre-commitment to reducing
the amount of losers. The "best loser" design allows for enough
stability to maintain a slow and steady endogenous growth of
negative rights and the rule of law essential for development.223 The
formal constraints are important, and this article has sought to
consider them in looking at Mauritius as an example. However, the
informal changes and growth that exist as a result of this formal
system are just as important. North argues:
Changes in informal constraints -norms, con-
ventions, or personal standards of honesty, for example
-have the same originating sources of change as do
changes in formal rules; but they occur gradually and
sometimes quite subconsciously as individuals evolve
alternative patterns of behavior consistent with their
newly perceived evaluation of costs and benefits.
The process of change is overwhelmingly incre-
mental .... The reason is that the economies of scope,
the complementarities, and the network externalities
that arise from a given institutional matrix of formal
rules, informal constraints, and enforcement char-
acteristics will typically bias costs and benefits in favor
of choices consistent with the existing framework. The
larger the number of rule changes, ceterus paribus the
221 MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 501-02 (2009) (discussing "two important aspect of consti-
utional design: first, pre-commitment strategies that limit governmental powers and
that channel decision making through specified procedures, and second, mechanisms
that reduce agency costs by limiting opportunities for government officials to benefit
from pursuing objectives that depart from those for whom they are expected to serve
and for whose benefit they derive their power.").
222 DE SOTO, supra note 198, at 81-89; Olson, supra note 204.
221 See supra Part I11.B.2.
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greater the number of losers and hence opposition.
Therefore . .. institutional change will occur at those
margins considered most pliable in the context of the
bargaining power of interested parties. 224
Minimizing the costs to the losers minimizes opposition to change at
the margin. The Mauritian constitutional structure provides a
framework to enhance stability and allow development-enhancing
changes at the margin.
C. Moving Forward
Considering Mauritius as a model, along with the institu-
tional benefits, it is apparent that there are concrete lessons for
development. Analyzing a success story, such as Mauritius, provides
the tools to understand some of the developing world's greatest
challenges. When considering any development problem it is
essential to account for those who stand to lose from any changes to
the status quo. A benefit of a participatory democracy example like
Mauritius is it demonstrates one way for an institutional structure to
minimize the losers, which helps provide stability for gradual
change. This outcome is also essential because it helps address the
problem of law and legal institutions as a source for development
reforms .225
Law and legal institutions each risk having a central focus,
ignoring the need for local knowledge. Hayek famously stated that
"[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little
224 Douglas C. North, Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis 5-6, (Research
Papers in Econ., Working Paper No. 9412001, 1994), available at http:/
129.3.20.41 /eps/eh/papers/9412/9412001 .pdf.
225 See generally PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (providing a collection of articles
addressing the role the rule of law and rule of law reforms have and have not played
in global development challenges)); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (considering
multiple points of view from the development economics field to describe the
changing way in which development practitioners think about and implement rule of
law reforms)).
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they really know about what they imagine they can design."226 It is
just as true that the curious task of rule of law and legal institutional
reform in development is to demonstrate how little men can design.
Providing a structure for incremental movement emphasizes
decentralization as opposed to centralization.
The Mauritian representative democratic system is one model
for lowering the risk of external costs. When most members of society
are at a lower risk for another group imposing costs on them there is
more freedom for private ordering. This article is not intended to
argue that representative democracy is a panacea for questions of
economic development. In fact, this article suggests quite the
opposite: that Mauritius provides one example of a system with
endogenous roots that has allowed continuous growth. Legal
institutions are essential to development to the extent they foster
liberty without stifling growth, a central plan to avoid a central plan.
James Madison arguing for the U.S. Constitution captured this
concept perfectly, "[i]n framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself."227 Mauritius is an example
because it shows this balance can exist in the developing world and
that legal institutions can have a tangible impact on development.
VI. HAITI
There are many challenges in the developing world, some of
which are ongoing as countries strive towards economic
improvements, and some of which are brought about by crisis. In
January 2010, Haiti faced a devastating earthquake in its capital Port-
au-Prince. 228 As Haiti recovers while also facing challenges similar to
226 F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 76 (W.W. Bartley
11I ed., 1988).
227 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
228 Simon Romero & Marc Lacey, Fierce Quake Devastates Haitian Capital, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20100/1/13/world/americas/13
haiti.html.
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other countries in the developing world, considering the Mauritian
case may provide some guidance.229 While Mauritius and Haiti do
not share similar ethnic heterogeneity, the two countries do share a
common Creole speaking culture.230
Haiti currently operates, at least on paper, in a republican
form of government under a somewhat recent Constitution.231 Before
discussing Haiti's current constitutional structure it is important to
note the Haitian Constitution's tumultuous history since Haiti first
adopted it in 1987. Not long after adopting the Constitution it was
suspended from 1988-1989.232 While the Constitution was technically
fully reinstated in 1994, normal constitutional elections did not
resume until 2006.233 Given the Constitution's history as well as the
problems of governing after a natural disaster, one must consider
Haiti's Constitution while fully understanding that the system
designed on paper is not necessarily an accurate representation of
local conditions.
The Haitian national legislature discussed in Chapter II, Sec-
tion C of the Constitution is a bicameral legislature that has
traditional legislative powers.234 The Executive role established in
Chapter III, Section A is very similar to the role played by the
Executive in the United States.235 The only exception is that the
President shares his or her role with a prime minister that the
President appoints from the majority party in Parliament. 236 Finally,
Chapter IV provides a judiciary that operates similarly to the
Supreme Court in the United States.237
229 David Carment & Yiagadeesen Samy, The Mauritian Miracle and the Haitian
Tragedy, CITIZEN SPECIAL, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/
128 1.pdf.230 id.
231 1987 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI Mar. 29, 1987.
232 STEEVE COUPEAU, THE HISTORY OF HAITI 127-162 (2008).
233 See Mark Schuller, Seeing Like a "Failed" ANGO, 30 POLAR 67, 71-73 (2007).
234 1987 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI Mar. 29, 1987, tit. V, ch. 11, art. 98-103.
235 Id. at tit. V, ch. III, art. 134-135.
236 id.
237 1987 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI Mar. 29, 1987, tit. IV.
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Though Mauritius faces greater ethnic division than Haiti, the
Mauritian constitutional structure has proved to be more stable. 238 It
is possible that the need to balance the heterogeneous population in
Mauritius fosters a more stable government, as the minority groups
each have a vested interest in continuing a stable government and
their aggregated interests foster stability. It is also possible that even
though the British seemingly imposed a system of government on
Mauritius, the form of government carefully considered the makeup
of the Mauritian population and designed a government specifically
tailored to those needs. The Mauritian lesson for Haiti is not certain,
but if nothing else it encourages development practitioners assisting
with the Haitian recovery to consider the importance of consti-
tutional structure and electoral design when attempting to ensure
stability moving forward.
There is cause for optimism, and Haiti has a unique oppor-
tunity moving forward with its recovery from the January 2010
earthquake. While the recovery will likely be long and painful, Haiti
has a chance to revisit its electoral system and consider alternatives
that will foster greater stability and help solidify economic
improvements made during the Haitian recovery.
VII. CONCLUSION
In some ways, Mauritius had no choice but to implement an
electoral system that encouraged participatory politics. With forty-
four percent of the country opposed to independence - a bloc
composed of "virtually the entire non-Indian population" -creating a
system that brought all the ethnic groups together seemed a
necessity.239 The results have been positive: "These institutions have
ensured free and fair elections, the rule of law, a vibrant and
independent press, and respect for property rights .... ,240 Different
parties win elections, conflicts are resolved within the system, and
238 See Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 222.
239 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 241.
240 Id
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"democratic practices are 'deeply internalized' in the expectations of
citizens and rulers and in the workings of society." 241 Perhaps most
importantly, these elections are not followed by violence. The
Mauritian success story provides an important starting point for
considering development problems either in Sub-Saharan Africa or in
countries such as Haiti. While Haiti does not share the same hetero-
geneous ethnic makeup, its shared culture with Mauritius makes it
important to consider the Mauritian example as Haiti continues to
recover from the January 2010 earthquake.
241 Brdiutigam, supra note 2, at 45.
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